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Abstract
We study voting games on binary is-
sues, where voters might hold an objec-
tive over some issues at stake, while will-
ing to strike deals on the remaining ones,
and can influence one another’s voting
decision before the vote takes place. We
analyse voters’ rational behaviour in the
resulting two-phase game, showing un-
der what conditions undesirable equilib-
ria can be removed as an effect of the pre-
vote phase.
1 Introduction
Social choice theory, and voting theory in particular, have
been gaining increased attention in the multiagent systems
(MAS) literature in the last decade, and voting is considered
a fundamental tool for the study of MAS [Brandt et al., 2014].
In the face of the extreme popularity of the voting
paradigm, the MAS literature studying voting as a fully-
fledged form of strategic interaction, i.e., as a non-cooperative
game, is very small (although growing, e.g., [Desmedt and
Elkind, 2010; Xia and Conitzer, 2010; Obraztsova et al.,
2013]). In particular, no work with the notable exception of
the literature on iterative voting [Meir et al., 2010; Lev and
Rosenschein, 2012; Braˆnzei et al., 2013] has studied how
voting behavior in rational agents is influenced by strategic
forms of interaction that precede the voting stage. Litera-
ture in social choice has recognised that interaction preced-
ing voting can be an effective tool to induce opinion change
and achieve compromise solutions [Dryzek and List, 2003;
List, 2011] while in game theory pre-play negotiations are
known to be effective in overcoming inefficient allocations
caused by players’ individual rationality [Jackson and Wilkie,
2005]. When players are allowed to offer a part of their gains
at certain outcomes to influence the decisions of the other
agents, they are able to overcome highly inefficient scenarios,
such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma [Jackson and Wilkie, 2005].
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In this paper we study pre-vote negotiations in voting
games over binary (yes/no) issues, where voters hold a spe-
cial type of lexicographic preferences over the set of issues at
stake, i.e., hold an objective about a subset of them while they
are willing to negotiate on the remaining ones, and can influ-
ence one another before casting their ballots by transferring
utility in order to obtain a more favourable outcome. We show
that this type of pre-vote interaction has beneficial effects on
voting games by refining their set of equilibria.
Related work Our approach relates directly to several on-
going lines of research in social choice, game theory and their
applications to MAS.
Binary Aggregation and Voting Games. We study societies
of voters that express a yes/no opinion on issues at stake.
The setting is also known as voting in multiple referenda
and closely related to the growing literature on voting games.
Classical references include the work of Dhillon and Lock-
wood [2004] and Messner and Polborn [2007], and more re-
cently lead to computational studies of best-response dynam-
ics in voting games [Meir et al., 2010; Xia and Conitzer,
2010; Lev and Rosenschein, 2012]. In binary voting, aside
from the (non-)manipulability of voting rules (see, for in-
stance, [Dietrich and List, 2007b]), non-cooperative game-
theoretic aspects are underexplored and are our focus here.
Binary voting can be further enriched by imposing that in-
dividual opinions also need to satisfy a set of integrity con-
straints, like in binary voting with constraints [Grandi and
Endriss, 2013] and judgment aggregation [Dietrich and List,
2007a; Grossi and Pigozzi, 2014]. Standard preference aggre-
gation, which is the classical framework for voting theory, is
a special case of binary voting with constraints [Dietrich and
List, 2007a]. Voting with constraints will be touched upon to-
wards the end of the paper.
Boolean games. We model voting strategies in binary
aggregation as boolean games [Harrenstein et al., 2001;
Wooldridge et al., 2013], allowing voters to have control of
a set of propositional variables, i.e., their ballot, and to as-
sign utilities to outcomes, with specific goal outcomes they
want to achieve. In our setting however goals of individuals
are expressed on the outcome of the decision process, thus
on outcomes that do not depend on their single choice only.
Unlike boolean games, where each actor uniquely controls a
propositional variable, in our setting the control of a variable
is shared among the voters and its final truth value is deter-
mined by a voting rule.
Election control. The field of computational social choice
has extensively studied lobbying [Christian et al., 2007;
Bredereck et al., 2014] and bribery [Baumeister et al., 2013;
Hazon et al., 2013], modelled from the single agent perspec-
tive of a lobbyist or briber who tries to influence voters’ deci-
sions through monetary incentives, or from the perspective of
a coalition of colluders [Bachrach et al., 2011]. Here we study
forms of control from a non-cooperative game-theoretic per-
spective where any voter can influence any other voter.
Equilibrium refinement. Non-cooperative models of voting
are known to suffer from a multiplicity of equilibria, many
of which appear counterintuitive. Equilibrium selection or
refinement is a vast and long-standing research program in
game theory [Meyerson, 1978]. Models of equilibrium refine-
ment have been applied to voting games in the literature on
economics [Gueth and Selten, 1991; Kim, 1996] and within
MAS [Desmedt and Elkind, 2010; Obraztsova et al., 2013],
as well as the above mentioned iterative voting model, which
offers a natural strategy for selecting equilibria through best
response dynamics from the profile of truthful votes. In this
paper we study a two-phase model for equilibrium refinement
in a voting game where equilibria are selected by means of an
initial pre-vote negotiation phase.
Pre-play negotiations. We model negotiations as a pre-play
interaction phase, in the spirit of Jackson and Wilkie [2005].
During this phase, which precedes the play of a normal form
game, players are entitled to sacrifice a part of their final
utility in order to convince their opponents to play certain
strategies, which in our case consist of voting ballots. In do-
ing so we build upon and simplify the framework of endoge-
nous boolean games [Turrini, 2013], which enriches boolean
games with a pre-play phase.
Paper contribution and outline We describe a model of
equilibrium refinement for voting games which: (i) is applica-
ble to one-shot voting in the general context of binary aggre-
gation; (ii) does not rely on limit behavior in repeated interac-
tions; and (iii) can capture the compromise-seeking phase that
typically precedes decision-making by voting. More specifi-
cally we address the effect of pre-play negotiations on the
outcomes of voting games on binary (yes-no) issues. We iso-
late precise conditions under which bad equilibria – e.g., in-
efficient ones – can be overcome, and good ones sustained.
The paper is organised as follows. First, in Section 2 we
present the setting of binary aggregation, defining the (issue-
wise) majority rule and a more general class of aggregation
procedures, which constitute the rules of choice for the cur-
rent paper. Second, we define voting games for binary aggre-
gation, specifying individual preferences by means of both
a goal and a utility function, and we show how undesirable
equilibria can be removed by appropriate modifications of
the game matrix (Section 3). Third, we present a full-blown
model of collective decisions as a two-phase game, with a
negotiation phase preceding the vote. We show how the set
of equilibria can be refined by means of rational negotiations
removing undesirable equilibria and, dually, maintaining de-
sirable ones (Section 4). Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
We model situations of collective decision-making in the
framework of binary aggregation. In this setting a finite set
of agents express yes/no opinions on a finite set of binary is-
sues, and these opinions are then aggregated into a collective
decision over each issue.
Definition 1 (BA structure). A binary aggregation structure
(BA structure) is a tuple S = 〈N , I〉 where:
• N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set individuals s.t. |N | is odd1
and ≥ 3;
• I = {1, . . . ,m} is a finite set of issues.
We denote D = {B | B : I → {0, 1}} the set of all possible
binary opinions over the set of issues I and call an element
B ∈ D a ballot. Thus, B(j) = 0 (respectively, B(j) = 1)
indicates that the agent who submits ballot B rejects (respec-
tively, accepts) the issue j.
A profile B = (B1, . . . , Bn) is the choice of a ballot for
every individual in N . We write Bi to denote the ballot of
individual i within a profile B. Thus, Bi(j) = 1 indicates
that individual i accepts issue j in profileB. Furthermore we
denote by NBj = {i ∈ N | Bi(j) = 1} the set of individuals
accepting issue j in profileB.
Definition 2 (Aggregation rule). Given a BA structure S,
an aggregation rule (or aggregator) for S is a function
F : DN → D, mapping every profile to a binary ballot in D.
F (B)(j) denotes the outcome of the aggregation on issue j.
Possibly the best-known aggregation rule is issue-by-issue
strict majority rule (maj ), which accepts an issue if and only
if the majority of voters accept it, formally maj (B)(j) = 1
if and only if |NBj | ≥ |N |+12 . Other notable examples of ag-
gregation rules include quota rules, which accept an issue if
the number of voters accepting it exceeds a possibly different
quota for each issue, and distance-based rules, which output
the ballot that minimises the overall distance to the profile for
a suitable notion of distance.
Example 1. A parliament composed by equally representa-
tive parties A,B,C is to decide whether to develop atomic
weapons (W), importing nuclear technology from the foreign
market (F), and build in-house nuclear plants (P). The profile
in Table 1 is an instance of binary aggregation with the ma-
jority rule, in which each individual submits a binary opinion
over each of the three issues at stake.
W F P
Party A 1 0 1
Party B 1 1 0
Party C 0 0 0
Majority 1 0 0
Table 1: An instance of binary aggregation
1The assumption guarantees that the majority rule we are going
to introduce below is unbiased between accepting or rejecting issues
(cf. [Grossi and Pigozzi, 2014, Ch. 2]). It could be dropped at the
expense of adding some further technicalities to the framework.
Given an aggregation rule F , we call a set of votersC ⊆ N
a winning coalition if for every profile B, issues j ∈ I and
x ∈ {0, 1}, if C = {i ∈ N | Bi(j) = x} then F (B)(j) = x.
We call C a resilient winning coalition if C is a winning
coalition and C \ {i} is also a winning coalition for every
i ∈ C.2 Given an aggregator F , we denote with WF the
set of winning coalitions for F , and with W+F the set of re-
silient winning coalitions. In the case of the majority rule we
have W+maj =
{
C ⊆ N | |C| ≥ |N |+12 + 1
}
, i.e., all coali-
tions exceeding the majority threshold of at least one element
are resilient.
Aggregation rules are classified by means of axioms that
bind the properties of the outcome at certain profiles. We re-
fer the reader to the relevant literature for a formal treatment
of axiomatic properties. Here we provide just the following
definitions in terms of winning coalitions:
Definition 3 (Systematicity). An aggregator F is called sys-
tematic if it can be characterised through winning coalitions,
i.e., if there exists a setWF ⊆ 2N such that for all profilesB
and issues j ∈ I, we have that F (B)(j) = 1 iff NBj ∈ WF .
Definition 4 (Monotonicity). A systematic rule F is called
monotonic if its set of winning coalitions is closed under su-
persets, i.e., for all C ∈ WF , if C ⊆ C ′ then C ′ ∈ WF .
The majority rule and all quota rules satisfy these axioms,
but systematicity, for instance, is violated by most distance-
based rules. In this paper we focus on systematic and mono-
tonic rules, as a strict generalisation of the majority rule.
3 Aggregation Games
In this section we present the model of a strategic game
played by voters involved in a collective decision-making
problem on binary issues. The players’ strategies consist of
all binary ballots and players’ preferences are expressed in
the form of a goal that is interpreted on the outcomes of the
aggregation (i.e., the collective decision), and by an explicit
payoff function for each player i, yielding to i a real number
at each profile and encoding, intuitively, the material value
he would receive, should that profile of votes occur. Given a
set of issues I, let PS = {p1, . . . , pm} contain one proposi-
tional atom for each issue in I and LPS be the propositional
language constructed by closing PS under a functionally com-
plete set of Boolean connectives (e.g., {¬,∧}).
Definition 5 (Aggregation games). An aggregation game is
a tuple A = 〈N , I, F, {γi}i∈N , {pii}i∈N 〉 where:
• 〈N , I〉 is a binary aggregation structure;
• F is an aggregation rule for 〈N , I〉;
• each γi is a cube, i.e. a conjunction of literals fromLPS;3
• pii : DN → R is a payoff function assigning to each
profile a real number denoting the utility of player i.
A strategy profile in an aggregation game is a profile of bi-
nary ballots, and will be denoted with B. Intuitively, goals
2Cf. the notion of k-resiliency in [Halpern, 2011].
3Formally, each γi is equivalent to
∧
j∈K `j where K ⊆ I and
`j = pj or `j = ¬pj for all j ∈ K.
represent positions that players are not willing to sacrifice. By
making the assumptions that goals are cubes we assume that
each voter has a simple incentive structure, and can identify
a certain set of atoms that she would like to be positive, an-
other set of atoms that she would like to be negative, and that
she is indifferent to all others. When comparing two states,
one of which satisfying his goal and one of which not satis-
fying it, a player will choose the state satisfying his goal. In
case of indifference with respect to goals, players will look at
the value yielded by the payoff function. This is technically
called a quasi-dichotomous preference relation [Wooldridge
et al., 2013]. Henceforth we employ the satisfaction relation
|= (respectively, its negation 6|=) to express that a ballot satis-
fies (respectively, does not satisfy) a goal.
Definition 6. Let A = 〈N , I, F, {γi}i∈N , {pii}i∈N 〉 be an
aggregation game, B,B′ be two ballot profiles and i ∈ N
a player. The preference relation pii for each i ∈ N is such
thatB pii B′ iff:• [F (B′) 6|= γi and F (B) |= γi] or
• [F (B′) |= γi ⇔ F (B) |= γi] and pii(B) ≥ pi′i(B).
In other words, a profile B is preferred by player i to B′ if
either F (B) satisfies i’s goal and F (B′) does not or, if both
satisfy i’s goal or neither do,B yields to i a better payoff than
B′. Individual preferences over strategy profiles are therefore
induced by their goals, by their payoff functions, and by the
aggregation procedure used.
A natural class of aggregation games is that of games
where the individual utility only depends on the outcome of
the collective decision:
Definition 7. An aggregation gameA is called uniform if for
all i ∈ N and profiles B it is the case that pii(B) = pii(B′)
whenever F (B) = F (B′). It is called constant, if all pii are
constant functions, i.e., for all i ∈ N and all profiles B we
have that pii(B) = pii(B′).
Clearly, all constant aggregation games are uniform. Games
with uniform payoff are arguably the most natural examples
of aggregation games. The payoff each player receives is only
dependent on the outcome of the vote, and not on the ballot
profile that determines it. For convenience, we assume that
in uniform games the payoff function is defined directly on
outcomes, i.e., pii : D → R.
Adapting a standard definition from the literature, we call a
strategy B i-truthful if it satisfies γi. In case γi is a complete
cube that specifies fully a single binary ballot, i.e., the agent
has one precise objective over all issues at stake, we fall into
the classic setting of having a unique truthful strategy and all
other ballots available for strategic voting.
Definition 8. Let C ⊆ N . We call a strategy profile B =
(B1, . . . , Bn):
(i) C-truthful if all Bi with i ∈ C are i-truthful, i.e., Bi |=
γi, for all i ∈ C;
(ii) C-goal-efficient (C-efficient) if F (B) |= ∧i∈C γi;
(iii) totally C-goal-inefficient (totally C-inefficient) if
F (B) |= ∧i∈C ¬γi.
One last piece of notation: let us call a game C-consistent, for
C ⊆ N , if the conjunction of the goals of agents in coalition
C is consistent, i.e., if
∧
i∈C γi is satisfiable.
Equilibria in Uniform Aggregation Games
In this section we explore the existence of Nash equilibria
(NE) in aggregation games and their properties, paying spe-
cial attention to NE that are truthful and efficient. We omit the
easier proofs in the interest of space.
We start with the following result. Recall that a strategy Bi
is weakly dominant for agent i if for all profiles B we have
that (B−i, Bi) pii B.
Proposition 1. If A is a constant aggregation game for the
majority rule, then for every i ∈ N every i-truthful strategy
is weakly dominant.
Proof. Let B∗i be i-truthful and let B
′
i be any non-truthful
strategy for i. We show that for each profileB−i we have that
(B−i, B∗i ) pii (B−i, B′i). Since payoffs are constant by as-
sumption, we can reason by case distinction as follows. There
are four cases. Both maj (B−i, B∗i ) and maj (B−i, B
′
i) sat-
isfy γi (1) or do not satisfy it (2). In both these cases
B∗i weakly dominates B
′
i. If (3) maj (B−i, B
∗
i ) satisfies
γi and maj (B−i, B′i) does not, then B
∗
i strictly domi-
nates B′i. Finally, (4) maj (B−i, B
∗
i ) does not satisfy γi but
maj (B−i, B′i) does. Since γi =
∧
j∈X `j , then there exists a
k ∈ X such that maj (B−i, B∗i ) 6|= `k but maj (B−i, B′i) |=
`k. Assume wlog that `k is positive, i.e., `k = pk. Since B∗i
is assumed to be truthful, we know that B∗i |= `k which
in turns implies that B∗i (k) = 1. By the systematicity of
the majority rule we know that the acceptance of issue k in
profile B depends solely on the acceptance of issue k by i.
Combining our assumption that maj (B−i, B′i)(k) = 1 with
the monotonicity of the majority rule, we can infer that also
maj (B−i, B∗i )(k) = 1, against our assumption that this last
profile does not satisfy `k.
It follows that every constant aggregation game has a NE.
Remark 2 (Generalisation). Proposition 1 can be gen-
eralised to all aggregation rules that are systematic and
monotonic, and therefore non-manipulable in social-choice-
theoretic sense [Dietrich and List, 2007b].
The following example shows that Proposition 1 ceases to
hold if we allow the goals of the voters to be propositional
formulas more complex than a cube:
Example 2. Let there be three voters, and let agent 1’s goal
be that of having an odd number of accepted issues, while
agents 2 and 3 have no specific goals. Let B2 = (1, 0, 0) and
B3 = (0, 1, 0). The 1-truthful ballot B1 = (0, 0, 1) results
under the majority rule in (0, 0, 0), and is hence dominated
by ballot (1, 0, 1) which is non-truthful but results in (1, 0, 0).
This last outcome has has an odd number of accepted issues
and hence satisfies 1’s goal.
We now observe that Proposition 1 does not generalise to
uniform aggregation games, i.e., games where the utility of
players depends solely on the outcome of the aggregation:
Proposition 3. There exist uniform aggregation games for
maj in which truthful strategies are not dominant.
Proof. Consider the set of issues {p, q, t} and a set N =
{1, 2, 3}. Let γ1 = ¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬t, γ2 = ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬t, and
γ3 = ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ t. Define the payoff function as follows, let
pii(B) = 1 for i = 3 andB = (0, 1, 0), and 0 otherwise. Take
the following profiles: B1 = ((0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1))
and B2 = ((0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)). Since maj (B1) =
(0, 0, 0) and maj (B2) = (0, 1, 0), we have B2 pi3 B1 and
B1, unlikeB2, comprises a truthful strategy by 3.
The fact that truthful voting is not always a dominant strat-
egy for aggregation games with sigle-model goals might seem
counterintuitive, especially when the payoff is required to be
uniform across profiles leading to the same outcome. It is
however sufficient to recall that when a player is in the po-
sition of changing the outcome of the decision in a certain
profile this does not necessarily mean he has the power to
satisfy his goal, but he might simply choose the outcome he
prefers because of the payoff.
Despite the negative result in Proposition 3, we can still
prove the existence of truthful and efficient equilibria in a uni-
form aggregation game if we assume the mutual consistency
of the individual goals of a resilient winning coalition.
Proposition 4. Let F be a systematic and monotonic aggre-
gator, and letC ∈ W+F . EveryC-consistent uniform aggrega-
tion game for F has a NE that is C-truthful and C-efficient.
Proof. Take a C-consistent game. Then there exists a ballot
B∗ such that B∗ |= ∧i∈C γi. Take now any ballot profile
B∗ such that B∗ is the ballot of all and only the voters in C
while all agents in N\C vote the inverse ballot B∗ (that is,
for any issue j, B∗(j) = 1 iff B
∗
(j) = 0). Since C ∈ WF
(by the assumption that C ∈ W+F ) we have that F (B∗) =
B∗. Clearly F (B∗) satisfies
∧
i γi, and each individual in C
votes truthfully. We show that B∗ is a Nash equilibrium, by
showing that (a) no agent in N\C has a profitable deviation,
and (b) no agent in C has a profitable deviation. As to (a),
since F is monotonic, any change in the ballotB
∗
(j) by some
voter inN\C does not change the outcome F (B∗) = B∗. As
to (b), any change in the ballot B∗ by some voter in C does
not change the outcome because C ∈ W+F . This completes
the proof.
On the other hand, undesirable equilibria may occur even
when all agents have compatible goals.
Proposition 5. There exist N -consistent aggregation games
for maj with NE that areN -truthful and totallyN -inefficient.
Proof. LetA be an aggregation game for maj such that γi =
pi, and let B∗ be the profile illustrated in Table 2. Let all
payoff functions pii be constant. We can observe that B∗ is a
truthful profile, and therefore it is a NE by Proposition 1 and
by the fact that the game is constant. However, the outcome
of the majority rule in B∗ is totally inefficient, since none of
the individual goals are satisfied.
The goal of Section 4 is to show how to avoid such undesir-
able equilibria by allowing a pre-vote negotiation phase. We
anticipate this by showing the effect of payoff redistributions
on the equilibria of the aggregation game.
W F P
Party A 1 0 0
Party B 0 1 0
Party C 0 0 1
Majority 0 0 0
Table 2: Inefficient equilibria
Goal-inefficiency and payoff transformations
We show that goal-inefficiency at equilibrium in uniform ag-
gregation games can be ruled out by means of a redistribution
of payoff among the members of a winning coalition. This
result is the stepping stone for the framework of Section 4.
Proposition 6. Let A = 〈N , I, F, {γi}i∈N , {pii}i∈N 〉
be a C-consistent uniform aggregation game for a sys-
tematic and monotonic procedure F , where C is a
winning coalition for F . Then, there exist payoff func-
tions {pi′i}i∈C such that
∑
i∈C pi
′
i(B) =
∑
i∈C pii(B)
for every profile B, and such that the game
A =
〈
N , I, F, {γi}i∈N , {pi′i}i∈C ∪ {pii}i6∈C
〉
has no
C-inefficient NE.
Proof. Let B∗ be a ballot such that B∗ |= ∧i∈C γi. We
now construct a redistribution of payoffs in which player
1 ∈ C gives all other players in C an incentive to play
B∗, turning it into a weakly dominant strategy. Let M − 1
be the maximal payoff difference that some player can ob-
tain between two outcomes in the game 〈A, {pii}i∈N 〉. The
desired payoff functions are constructed as follows. For all
j 6= 1 such that j ∈ C define pi′j(B) = pij(B) + M for
all profiles B with Bj = B∗, and pi′j(B) = pij(B) oth-
erwise. Let finally pi′1(B) = pi1(B) − (
∑
16=k∈C pi
′
k(B) −∑
16=k∈C pik(B)). Observe that the construction of pi
′ en-
sures that
∑
i∈C pi
′
i(B) =
∑
i∈C pii(B), for every profileB.
Now letB be a C-inefficient profile of the new game and as-
sume towards a contradiction that it is a NE. Take an arbitrary
player j ∈ C such that Bj 6= B∗. Such a player exists since,
by monotonicity of F , if Bi = B∗ for all i ∈ C then profile
B is not C-inefficient. By construction of pi′j and the fact that
C is a winning coalition, player j ∈ C has an incentive to
deviate to B∗, henceB is not a NE. Contradiction.
In other words, given a uniform game, payoff functions al-
ways exist that can eliminate any NE which is goal-inefficient
for a winning coalition, while keeping the sum of players’
payoffs constant in the coalition. The new payoff function –
which, note, is not necessarily uniform any more – can be
thought of as a binding offer of payoff that a player makes to
the others, incentivising them to deviate to an outcome which
is goal-efficient for the coalition.
4 Endogenous Aggregation Games
The games we are going to study have two phases:
• A pre-vote phase, where, starting from a uniform ag-
gregation game, players make simultaneous transfers of
payoff to their fellow players;
• A vote phase, where players play the original aggrega-
tion game, but where payoffs are updated according to
the transfers occurred in the pre-vote phase.
We call these games endogenous aggregation games. The
key concept to define them is the one of transfer function
τi : DN × N → R+ (with i ∈ N ). These functions encode
the amount of payoff that a player i gives to player j should
a certain profile of votes B be played, in symbols, τi(B, j).
We call τ ∈ ∏i Ti a transfer profile, denoting by τ0 the void
transfer where at every profile every player gives 0 to the oth-
ers. So by τ(A) = 〈N , I, F, {γi}i∈N , {pi′i}i∈N 〉 we denote
the aggregation game with payoff obtained from A where pi′i
is updated according to the transfer profile τ as follows:
pi′i(B) = pii(B) +
∑
j∈N
τj(B, i)−
∑
j∈N
τi(B, j) (1)
It is important to notice that transfers do not preserve the uni-
formity of payoffs. We define now endogenous aggregation
games formally as follows:
Definition 9. An endogenous aggregation game is a tuple
AT = 〈A, {Ti}i∈N 〉whereA is a uniform aggregation game,
and each Ti is the set of all functions τi : DN ×N → R+.
Endogenous aggregation games will be analysed as exten-
sive form games with perfect information and simultaneous
choices. There are two phases in the overall game and there-
fore two choice points: in the first one a transfer profile is de-
termined; in the second one a ballot profile is determined. So
strategies of player i consist of sequential choices of a transfer
τi and a ballot Bi. Preference relations are naturally defined
between tuples of the form (τ,B): for two profiles of ballots
B,B′, the expression (τ,B) i (τ ′,B′) denotes that player
i prefers B after τ has been played in the pre-vote phase,
toB′ after τ ′ has been played in the pre-vote phase. Equilib-
rium analysis will be carried out using the solution concept of
reference for extensive games: subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium (SPE). To avoid complicating the framework with the
introduction of mixed strategies over lexicographic prefer-
ences – which bears notorious difficulties in terms of game-
theoretic analysis [Rubinstein, 2012] – and to keep the focus
on pure strategy equilibria, we make the following assump-
tion: (♠) for any game τ(A) with some pure strategy NE and
any player i ∈ N , a deviation by i to a game (τ ′i , τ−i)(A′)
with no pure strategy NE is never profitable for i.
Definition 10. Given an endogenous aggregation game
〈A, {Ti}i∈N 〉, we call a NE B of the aggregation game A
a surviving Nash equilibrium (SNE) if there exists a trans-
fer profile τ and a SPE of AT where (τ,B) is played on the
equilibrium path.
SPEs can be constructed through backward induction: first, a
NE is selected (whenever it exists) after each transfer profile;
second, a transfer profile is selected, such that no profitable
deviation exists for any player by changing her individual
transfer function. Intuitively, surviving Nash equilibria iden-
tify those electoral outcomes that can be rationally sustained
by an appropriate pre-vote negotiation. Clearly, not all Nash
equilibria of the initial game will be surviving equilibria. In
what follows we show that surviving equilibria display desir-
able properties, and pre-play negotiations can effectively act
as equilibrium refinement tools for aggregation games.
Equilibria in Endogenous Aggregation Games
Pre-vote negotiations can be shown to yield desirable effects
in terms of goal-efficiency, as shown in the following:
Theorem 7. Let AT = 〈A, {Ti}i∈N 〉 be a N -consistent en-
dogenous aggregation game for a systematic and monotonic
aggregator F . Then, everyN -efficient NE of 〈A, {pii}i∈N 〉 is
a surviving NE.
Proof. Let B be a N -efficient NE of A. We want to find a
transfer function τ∗ such that (τ∗,B) is a SPE of AT . Let
M − 1 be the maximal payoff difference between outcomes
as defined in the proof of Proposition 6. For all i, j ∈ N ,
let τ∗i (B
′, j) = 2M if B′i 6= Bi, and τ∗i (B′, j) = 0 other-
wise. In words, each player i is committing to play the bal-
lot Bi by offering the others 2M in case of deviation. Now
we show that (τ∗,B) is a SPE.4 First, notice that, since the
game is N -consistent and the goals are cubes (Definition 5),
by Proposition 1 (which applies because the assumptions of
monotonicity and systematicity for F ) and the construction
of τ ,B is a unique dominant strategy equilibrium. Now con-
sider the strategy profile (τ∗,B) of AT . We now show that a
deviation to some τ ′′i∗ by a player i
∗ is not profitable for i∗.
Observe that such a deviation can only be improving for i∗ if
it also leads some other player j to play something other than
Bj . If only i∗ deviates, then i∗ cannot do better given that B
is a NE by assumption and τ∗j (B
′, i∗) = 0 when B′j = Bj .
So suppose a NE B′′ is played in the second stage where
B′′j 6= Bj for some j 6= i∗. If no Nash equilibria exist in the
second stage, then by assumption (♠) a deviation from τ∗ is
not profitable. Let there be k ≥ 1 players j 6= i∗ for which
B′′j 6= Bj and consider some such j. By playing B′′j player
j’s payoff is:
pij(B
′′)− (|N | − 1)2M + 2M(k + 1) + τ ′′i∗(B′′, j).
If j plays Bj instead, then j’s payoff is:
pij(Bj ,B
′′
−j) + 2M(k + 1) + τ
′′
i∗(Bj ,B
′′
−j , j).
AsB′′ is a NE, it follows that:
τ ′′i∗(B
′′, j)− τ ′′i∗(Bj ,B′′−j , j) ≥ pij(Bj ,B′′−j)
− pij(B′′) + (|N | − 1)2M.
Given the definition of M and given the fact that |N |−1 ≥ 2
it follows that τ ′′i∗(B
′′, j) − τ ′′i∗(Bj ,B′′−j , j) > 3M , which
implies that τ ′′i∗(B
′′, j) > 3M . Therefore i∗’s utility in the
new equilibrium is at most pii∗(B′′)−k3M +k2M . The fact
that k ≥ 1 implies that pii∗(B′′) − k3M + k2M ≤ pii∗(B).
SinceB isN -efficient, then the constructed deviation τ ′′ can-
not be profitable.
4Our argument generalises the argument for pre-play negotia-
tions with more than two players given in the proof of Jackson and
Wilkie’s [2005, Theorem 4].
The converse of Theorem 7 holds true, and it generalises to
winning coalitions with internally consistent goals:
Theorem 8. Let AT = 〈A, {Ti}i∈N 〉 be an endogenous ag-
gregation game for a systematic and monotonic aggregator
F such that A is C-consistent for C ∈ WF . Then, every sur-
viving NE of AT is C-efficient.
Proof. We proceed by contraposition. Let B∗ be a NE that
is not C-efficient, i.e., such that F (B∗) 6|= γi for some in-
dividual i ∈ C, and assume towards a contradiction that
B∗ is a SNE. Therefore there exists a transfer function τ∗
and a SPE of AT such that (τ∗,B∗) is played on the equi-
librium path. We now construct a profitable deviation from
τ∗, leading to contradiction. By C-consistency of A there
exists a ballot B′ such that B′ |= ∧j∈C γj , hence in par-
ticular B′ |= γi. Let now i deviate to any transfer profile
τ ′ = (τ ′i , τ
∗
−i) such that she offers more than the payoff dif-
ference to all other players if they vote for ballot B′, i.e.,
τ ′i(B
′
j ,B
′′
−j , j) − τ∗i (B′′, j) > pij(B′′) − pij(B′j ,B′′−j), for
each j ∈ N , and eachB′′−j . By the fact thatB′ is C-efficient,
F systematic and monotonic, and C is a winning coalition,
this transfer makes each B′j , with j ∈ N \ {i}, (uniquely)
survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
All NE after playing τ ′ will now satisfy γi, making τ ′ a prof-
itable deviation.
Observe that Theorem 8 implies the existence of endoge-
nous aggregation games where no equilibria is surviving. This
is the case when distinct but overlapping coalitions have in-
compatible goals, as the following example shows:
Example 3. Let there be five players in N , and let F be
the majority rule. Let γ1 = p ∧ ¬r, γ2 = γ3 = γ4 = >
and let γ5 = r ∧ ¬p. Both coalitions C1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
C2 = {2, 3, 4, 5} are resilient winning coalitions, and the
game is bothC1 consistent andC2 consistent. Hence, by The-
orem 8 any surviving equilibria must be both C1-efficient and
C2 efficient, which is impossible given that the goals of the
two coalitions are mutually incompatible.
What happens in situations similar to the one presented in
Example 3 is that both player 1 and player 5 will offer ever
increasing amount of utility to the remaining three players,
in order to attain their goals. A deeper analysis of the coali-
tional structure induced by the goals, as well as a generalisa-
tion of the setting to budgeted goals may suggest solutions to
the problems highlighted in the previous example.
Results such as Theorems 7 and 8 suggest that pre-vote ne-
gotiations are a powerful tool players have to overcome the
inefficiencies of aggregation rules. More specifically, when
the goals of all players can be satisfied at the same time, pre-
vote negotiations allow players to engineer side-payments
leading to equilibrium outcomes that satisfy them, ruling out
all the others. We stress that players’ equilibrium strategies
in the two phase game remain individually rational strate-
gies and the game remains non-cooperative throughout – and
hence radically different from approaches like [Bachrach et
al., 2011] – even when equilibrium strategies end up sustain-
ing efficiency.
Remark 9 (Algorithms). An algorithm to compute a pre-vote
negotiation strategy that leads to a sustainable NE is pro-
vided in the proof of Theorems 7. The assumption of perfect
information is crucial here, and can be considered as an ap-
proximation of a real-world situation in which the goals and
payoffs of the agents can be assessed by means, e.g., of a poll.
Pre-vote negotiations and voting paradoxes
We show an application of endogenous aggregation games to
binary aggregation with constraints, or judgment aggregation
[Grandi and Endriss, 2013; Grossi and Pigozzi, 2014], where
individual ballots need to satisfy a logical formula, the in-
tegrity constraint, to be considered admissible. In case each
individual provides an admissible ballot, the obvious ques-
tion is whether the outcome of a given aggregation rule will
be admissible, as well. Here is an instance of this problem.
Example 4. Consider the scenario in Table 1. In line with
the intuitions behind the example, we stipulate that accepting
W while at the same time rejecting both F and P is not an
admissible opinion: if one wants to develop atomic weapons
one should either import nuclear technology or develop it do-
mestically. We can formulate this requirement in a proposi-
tional language as W → (F ∨ P ), making ballot (1, 0, 0)
inadmissible. All submitted ballots in the example satisfy this
requirement but the majority ballot does not (Table 1).
Paradoxical situations as those in Example 4 can be viewed
as undesirable outcomes of aggregation games. Assume to
this purpose each party to have the following goals: γ′A =
W,γ′B = F, γ
′
C = ¬P . Let piA = piB = piC be constant pay-
off functions. Observe that parties’ goals are all consistent
with the integrity constraint W → (F ∨P ), and that admissi-
ble ballot (1,1,0) satisfies each of them. The profile in Table 1
shows a truthful NE that however does not satisfy neither the
goal of party B nor the integrity constraint W → (F ∨ P ).
However, this equilibrium is not surviving because party B
could transfer enough utility to party C for it to vote for F .
In consistent aggregation games equilibria that give rise to
a voting paradox may not survive, whereas equilibria avoid-
ing such paradoxes are always sustained by a pre-vote nego-
tiation phase. But the key question is whether we can guaran-
tee that inadmissible equilibria do not survive.The following
proposition shows a simple sufficient condition. Let the in-
tegrity constraint be a formula IC, and call an individual i
responsible if γi |= IC, i.e., if i’s goal logically implies the
constraint. The following holds:
Proposition 10. IfA = 〈A, {Ti}i∈N 〉 is anN -consistent en-
dogenous aggregation game such that there exists a responsi-
ble player, then every surviving equilibrium is IC-consistent.
In particular, if all individual goals imply the integrity con-
straint, i.e., the goal of each party includes an admissible
decision, pre-vote negotiation will rule out all inadmissible
equilibria and some admissible outcome is bound to survive.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we studied the effect of a pre-vote phase be-
fore an aggregation game for binary voting, where voters
might hold an objective about a subset of the issues at stake
while willing to strike deals on the remaining ones. A num-
ber of papers in the literature on voting games have fo-
cused on the problem of avoiding undesirable equilibria (e.g.,
[Desmedt and Elkind, 2010] and [Obraztsova et al., 2013]).
Our proposal has been to study an explicit pre-vote negoti-
ation phase, during which agents can influence one another
before casting their ballots in order to obtain an individu-
ally more favourable electoral outcome. By doing so, we have
shown how undesirable equilibria can be eliminated (dually,
desirable ones sustained) as an effect of a rational distributed
negotiation phase, for a set of aggregators defined axiomati-
cally. We have also seen how these results have potential con-
sequences in avoiding paradoxical situations of aggregation
procedures, a core research problem in judgment aggregation
[Grossi and Pigozzi, 2014].
Future work include the study of aggregation games for
different voting procedures, e.g., distance-based ones, that do
not satisfy the axiom of systematicity. A second important
line of work is the study of budgeted transfer functions, in
which agents are endowed with limited resources to be used
in the negotiation phase. Finally, as observed in Remark 9, a
treatment of imperfect information is naturally called for.
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